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Most philosophical discussions of moral consideration for animals focus on
animals as a single category, neglecting to differentiate them by type or role (such as
wild, domestic, laboratory, or companion). Moreover, the importance of the individual
animal in terms of relationship to humans is de-emphasised.
Animals should not be discussed as a monolithic group. In this thesis the dog is
utilized as the paradigmatic animal to demonstrate that philosophical discourse on the
ethics of consideration for animals must reflect the diversity present within the group
labeled animals?. The major philosophical theories advocating moral consideration of
animals are summarized, noting that all animals are discussed as one category.
Anthropological evidence is provided to demonstrate the historical nature of the human-
dog bond. The ethics of care provides the foundation for the claim that dogs have
relational value and thus persons have the moral obligation to care for them.
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This thesis is dedicated to my mother, Colette Baggot.
I began this project with the goal of showing my mom just what itis that
motivates me, and what I am capable of doing. Unfortunately she died 6 months before
my defense and did not get a chance to read this thesis.
Her life and beliefs have always inspired mine and have given to me the wisdom,
energy, and optimism to pursue my dreams. Her spirit continues to give me hope and
courage.
This thesis is also dedicated Barley, my constant companion for 13 years. She
provides living evidence of the rich relationship possible between a person and a dog.
Barley proves that dogs can care for us.
"To pet a dog is not such a bad way to practice theology [or philosophy]. It is to
acknowledge wonder as the impulse that drives us out of ourselves, and it is to witness
reverence -as well as a plea for love and understanding- in the eyes of another," (Webb,
1998, 121).THE CANINE CONNECTION: AN ANTHROPOLOGICALLY GROUNDED
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE ON CARING FOR DOGS
Siobhan M BaggotINTRODUCTION
Dogs have been a very important part of my world for my entire life. I have had
many and various relationships with all manner of them and find them so integral to my
existence as to feel them inseparable from my sense of being. As a veterinarian my
working hours are filled with dogs and when I return home my own dog greets me. I love
dogs and care for them and feel I must somehow speak for them. I want others to know
dogs, to recognize their importance, and to understand the human-dog bond. In this thesis
I hope to show why we should care for dogs.
In order to provide perspective on the development of my passion for dogs I have
briefly outlined the most relevant canine relationships through my life. Cindy, a
longhaired dachshund was with my parents, living in Dublin with them, before I was
born. She was part of the Baggot family before I was. Fairy, a feisty, smooth haired fox
terrier was my first dog, in Columbus, Ohio. In primary school my first paying job was as
a neighbourhood dog walker, and in this way I became acquainted with a great many
dogs of all sizes from the parish priest's cocker spaniel to our neighbor's two Great Danes
who used to tow me along the street! In Australia I didn't have a dog, but instead my
parents bought me a horse to fill the hollow I temporarily felt for lack of an animal
companion. When we moved to California we brought Riah, a gorgeous Saluki with a
penchant for long distance running, into our home. She and I spent countless hours of my
adolescence together, at dog obedience lessons, playing Frisbee, swimming in Stonegate
Lake, and skateboarding down the road. My dad included Riah, along with my mom,
sister and me, in the dedication of his second book. We brought her to Ireland with us
when we returned there and during the six months of her mandatory quarantine the whole
family made weekly Sunday excursions to visit her in the boarding kennel over an hour's
drive away. A few years later I opened a dog grooming business in County Kildare and
became, yet again, professionally involved with dogs.
Back in the States four years later I adopted Barley from the Woodland Humane
Society, near Davis in California. She and I currently share the closest and most fulfilling
human-canine relationship I can imagine. We have lived together for 13 years, through
the toughest and most adventure-filled years of my life. We camped out in the deserttogether, out of tents and from my truck, through several years of archaeological
fieldwork. She tolerated my absences during the long days of vet school, and now enjoys
the luxury of a settled, rather comfortable, retirement, spending her hours either napping
at home or walking with me in the woods. The relationship I experience with her
constantly amazes me in its richness, depth and continual evolution. She has taught me
just how mutually involved a person and a dog can be, how intertwined two species' lives
can become. Without Barley it is unlikely that this thesis would have been written.
My love for dogs has shaped the form of my life in substantial ways. I became a
veterinarian in order to help dogs and other animals. During my veterinary education I
was faced with an ethical crisis of such magnitude that it become the guiding force of the
subsequent four years. As a third year vet student in Pullman I learned that several dogs
would be used in teaching exercises and then euthanised in order to provide me with
"patients" on which to practice anesthesia and surgery skills. I found this situation
sufficiently emotionally and ethically disturbing that my partner and I sought to take an
"alternative track", one that did not involve killing any dogs.
The decision to look for alternatives lead, in my senior year, to an opportunity to
become involved with an educational committee, the Animal Care and Use in Education
(ACUJE) Group. This diverse group of people included professors and students from the
Department of philosophy and the College of Veterinary Medicine, as well as
representatives of the university administration and the Vegetarian Resource Network.
All of us had in common the goal to provide a forum for community discussions and
education about animals, and the rights and obligations that define our relationship with
them.
It was as a member of this group that I began to grasp how I might further my
goal of speaking out more clearly for dogs. Courtney Campbell, of the philosophy
department, was also involved with the ACUIE group and he and I discussed animal
rights philosophies and my desire to educate people and help animals. He helped me to
focus this resolution by suggesting that I combine a MAIS degree in Applied Ethics with
my background in anthropology and the DVM degree. The path he described and I
followed has lead me here, to considering and writing about our obligation to care for
dogs as my thesis for the MAIS degree.In most philosophical discourse on the moral consideration of animals, all animals
are grouped together in a single category. All animals should not beconsidered
interchangeable in terms of morality. I propose that animals have different relevance and
roles and should be addressed in such a manner as to reflect this diversity. Dogs are used
as the paradigmatic example of a category of animalwith a value distinct from other
animals. Dogs are our companions. I propose that humans have the moral obligation to
care for dogs based on the mutual history and nature of ourrelationship with them.
Chapter one is the introduction. Chapter two provides brief summaries of the
main philosophies that advocate moral consideration of animals. The chapter is organized
with a focus on how each philosophy regards animals, whether they are seen as having
individual worth or value commensurate with the value of community and includes a
discussion of the categories of moral value that animals may possess. Chapter three
consists of the anthropological evidence for the longstanding bond between dogs and
humans. This chapter covers both the archaeological and the cultural aspects relating to
the domestication and enculturation of dogs into human society. Chapter four examines
the ethics of care introduced in the first chapter, as this philosophy provides the
foundation for my proposal that dogs have relational value. I provide further description
and critique of Nel Noddings' ethic and conclude by developing an ethic of care suitable
for use in guidance of human interactions with dogs. The epilogue presents my hopes for
using this thesis to further my goal of advocating for dogs in our society.
I recognize there are several limitations to my ethic of care, expanded to include
dogs, and I see these as areas on which to concentrate my next efforts. There is much
room for improvement of my thesis. The first limitation addresses the boundariesof
moral consideration of animals. I propose expanding the ethic of care to include dogs, as
they dwell I argue, in our inner circle of care. While expansion of the moral community
to include dogs is a step in the right direction, it is not enough. The argument of
relationality addresses how humans should treat companion animals, but does nothing to
enhance the lives of those animals for whom nobody cares. Adopting a biocentric
orientation and incorporating that spirit into the ethic of care may assist in overcoming
this limitation.The second limitation is that I chose to focus on the anthropological evidence for
the bond between humans and dogs. I did not include dog behavioural studies ordata
from human psychology or sociology because these are areas beyond thereach of this
thesis. The selection of anthropological evidence was deliberate, as I wanted to highlight
the longstanding historical nature of the bond. Limiting myself to inclusionof what is
present on the following pages was even difficult as I haveaccumulated many more
studies, but time and the limitations inherent in a Masters degree required me to select
only a sample of my data. I look forward to revising this thesis and includingethological
and psychological evidence on the nature and implications of the human-dogbond.
Thirdly I chose to focus on Nel Noddings' theory of the ethic of care, despite the
fact that I also referenced Karen J. Warren's version of caring ethics. Noddings' theory
provides the necessary foundational ideas from which all other theories of care may be
based.CHAPTER TWO
THE PHILOSOPHICAL BASIS FOR MORAL CONSIDERATION OF ANIMALS
The question of moral consideration of animals has long been discussed among
philosophers, from Aristotle to Inimanuel Kant to Jeremy Bentham, Tom Regan, and
Peter Singer. However the notion of moral consideration regarding animal rights was not
formally debated until the 1970s when the animal rights movement emerged in the wake
of the women's liberation movement and the campaign for equal racial rights. For the
most part all animals are discussed as a single category, without consideration of their
differing natures, roles, individuality, or value. In this chapter I first describe the four
types of value attributed to animals. Then I outline the arguments of the major proponents
for the ethical treatment of animals, beginning with utilitarianism, moving through
environmental ethics, theological biocentrism, the feminist ethic of care, and concluding
with two rights theories. I have ordered the philosophies in terms of degree of
consideration of the value of the individual animal, as this is an important component in
my assertion that dogs have relational value, an attribute that entails being valued both as
an individual and as part of a larger community. I describe each philosophy and highlight
the key points with emphasis as to how each contributes to my thesis.
Value
Those partaking in the animal rights debate generally discuss three types
of value. These are instrumental, intrinsic and inherent value. Instrumental value is
defined most basically as "the value an entity possesses in virtue of the value of the
consequences it produces; an entity's value as means" (Dictionary of Philosophy, 1956).
Extrinsic value is a synonymous term for instrumental value and is in opposition to
intrinsic value. Traditionally and without much argument most people will ascribe
instrumental value to domesticated animals. Domestic animals are valued for their
usefulness to us. They pull ploughs and sleds, produce fiber and horns, leather and food.
Some spend their lives in cages as the subjects of research or education. In many cases
these animals sacrifice their lives for us. Implicit in the definition of instrumental value is
the perception of valuelessness apart from utility, disposability once the use has beenfulfilled. The perception of domestic animals as possessing only instrumental value leads
to actions of abuse and cruelty. The living conditions that "beef" cattle on "factory
farms" endure, the lack of recognition of individuality suffered by dogs utilized for
scientific experiments, the cramped cages and artificial daylight suffered by "battery"
laying hens, and dairy cattle referred to as "production units" by their keepers, are but a
very few examples of the treatment given to domestic animals relegated to having only
instrumental value. When someone or something is valued only for what it can do for
another it is treated as an object rather than a subject. An animal objectified has no more
intrinsic value than a pencil. Like a pencil worn down to the nub, the animal is seen to be
disposable once its usefulness is dispensed.
Intrinsic value is defined as the kind of value something has apart from its
usefulness to others, "the value an entity would have if it were to have no consequences"
(1956). It is the opposite of instrumental value. Something can however have both
instrumental and intrinsic value.
Jay McDaniel, in Of God and Pelicans, makes four further points about intrinsic
value. 1) It is objective, by which he means that it is a value present in subjects-of-a-life
regardless; it is real. He points out that intrinsic value is "not assigned or ascribed, it is
recognized or discovered" (McDaniel, 1989, 65). 2) Intrinsic value is relational, meaning
it depends on the individual living within an environment and having interactions with
other beings. Existence is influenced by everything experienced. A subject without any
circumstances does not exist. 3) Possession of intrinsic value does not preclude an
individual having instrumental value as well. He gives the example of a deer, capably
negotiating his life in the woods. He is valuable to himself. He will also be valuable
instrumentally, when he dies and his body decomposes, providing nutrients to the
earthworms and soil of the forest. 4) Intrinsic value can be gradated, whereas inherent
value is an all or none quality (1989, 52).
The terms intrinsic value and inherent value are often used synonymously when
discussing rights, as the outcome specified by possession of such value is the same,
treatment with respect and care. To have either intrinsic or inherent value means to be
treated as an end and not a means to an end. For many animal rights advocates, intrinsic
value is said to be derived from an individual's possession of interests and experiences.Animal rights philosopher Bernard Rollin provides evidence from five sources that
animals have interests. Studies of neurophysiology show that animals have nervous
systems that interpret and manipulate external stimuli. There is evidence from ethology
of animal consciousness. Biochemistry studies prove that animals perceive pain and have
awareness. Comparative anatomy studies demonstrate the presence of sensory systems
very similar to ours which also suggests the presence of consciousness. Thesimilarities,
in all of the above categories, between human and non-human animals coupled with
evolutionary theory points to the fact that as humans enjoy consciousness, so do animals
(Rollin, 1981). If animals have interests and experiences then they have intrinsic value.
The last type of value is inherent value, which Tom Regan defines as the type of
value commensurate with being a subject-of-a-life (Regan, 1983, 244). It will be defined
in greater detail later in this chapter.
To the three aforementioned types of value I would add a fourth, that of relational
value. This is not generally an attribute discussed in terms of animals, but it has been
used to describe a quality present in those people we interact with and care about.
Relational value can be found in those ethical systems with emphasis on community and
interconnection, such as the ethic of care, biocentrism and process philosophy. It is this
type of value, I will argue, that dogs, among other beings, possess.
Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is the first philosophy I will describe, as it is the theory in which the
value of the individual for him or herself is secondary to the value of the individual to the
community. It is the principle for ethical guidance originated by English philosopher
Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832).
Utilitarian ethics seeks to achieve "The greatest good for the greatest number".
This phrase is an oversimplification of a weighty principle but it does capture the essence
of the proposal, as it is pithy and uncomplicated. Bentham defined the "good" in the
principle of utility as actions that promote pleasure and minimize pain. The value of each
pleasure or pain must be taken into consideration when determining which course of
action to pursue. Bentham proposed seven criteria to assist in assessment of pleasure or
pain. These include the intensity, duration, certainty of their occurrence, propinquity(nearness), fecundity (the chance it has of being followed by sensations of the same
kind), the purity of the pleasure or pain, and the number of persons it involves as well as
the radius of its extent. The factors must be summed up with the balance determining
whether the outcome of the contemplated action will be good or bad.
The second utilitarian consideration is that of numbers of individuals benefiting
from the action. Therefore a good action follows a sum in favour on the side of pleasure,
with benefit for the greatest number, while a bad action will inflict disproportionate pain
or will not benefit the majority. This is a community-based philosophy with the
individual's needs subordinated to those of the majority; by default the welfare of some
individuals will be compromised for the communal good.
Jeremy Bentham rejected the philosophical view that the individuals taken into
consideration for the overall good must be human persons. He argued that animals too
should be taken into consideration. He believed that causing an animal to suffer is an act
as wrongful as the treatment of slaves. An individual's sentience, or capacity to suffer, is
the criterion for moral consideration.
"The French have already discovered that the blackness of the skin is no reason
why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a
tormentor. It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the
villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally
insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. The question is not,
Can they reason? Nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?"
(Bentham, 1789 in Pojman, 2000, 232).
In 1975 Australian philosopher Peter Singer published the groundbreaking book
Animal Liberation in which he developed a theory of utilitarianism as it applies to
animals. Singer rooted his argument in Bentham's philosophy, capitalising on the
expansiveness of personhood status inherent in the original theory and he proposed that
animals be included in the moral equation. Animals' suffering should count equally with
human suffering when tallying up the factors determining the best action to take. Each
individual (human or nonhuman animal) that can suffer should count as one. To do
otherwise is to practice "speciesism", which Singer defines as "a prejudice or attitude ofEli]
bias toward the interests of members of one's own species and against those members of
other species" (Singer, 1975, 7). Singer proposed that sentience become the criterion by
which animals are deemed members of the moral community.
There are several problematic issues inherent in utilitarianism, and these have
been well debated among philosophers. Feminists such as Carol Gilligan and Jean
Grimshaw have argued very strongly against it and they delineate three main problems.
The most basic is that utilitarianism tends to devalue the individual in favour of the
whole. The second criticism is that it proposes to offer a universal principle upon which
all actions can be based. Thirdly, it is grounded solely in rationality as the basis for
choosing the best action to take and this leaves no place for emotional factors in choices,
messy situations, or relationships (Wennberg, 2003).
Utilitarianism does tend to neglect those choices based on emotions or beliefs. We
are not purely rational beings able to find satisfaction in the greatest good for the greatest
number. Each one of us is an individual and each claims existence and satisfaction of our
desires. Intuition, beliefs and diversity are part of our constitution and contribute to the
richness of society. Moreover a rigid system such as utilitarianism cannot be flexible
enough to encompass all possible situations and the nuances implicit in relationships. The
egalitarianism of utilitarianism leaves no room for actions based on love, beauty, or
freedom.
Although utilitarianism has been useful in expanding moral protection to animals
by giving animals equal value to humans in terms of the balancing of goods, it does not,
some argue, go far enough in protecting them against the incursions of human desires.
Utilitarianism has been utilized to argue in favour of using animals for research whereby
the benefits to humanity are said to outweigh the cost of animals' lives. As the best action
is that which benefits the greatest number, those in the group not benefiting will suffer
the consequences. It appears that the practice of utilitarianism does not value beings (of
any species) as valuable unto themselves; all value appears to be instrumental, as that
which is useful to the community good.
The Land EthicConservationist and author of A Sand County Almanac (1949), Aldo Leopold is
considered the father of environmental ethics. He developed a system of morality called
the Land Ethic that is similar to utilitarianism in its community orientation. It differs
however in that it does not present the greatest good as that which benefits the greatest
number, but rather portrays the greatest good as that which benefits the ecological
community. "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability and beauty
of the biotic community. It is wrong when it does otherwise" (Leopold, 1949).
The fundamental and novel feature of Leopold's land ethic is that he extends
moral considerability from people to nonhuman natural entities. He entreats us to learn
what we can from ecology to guide us in our morality and to focus us on relationships
between and among living organisms. Ecologists teach a holistic view of the world and
the land ethic draws from this paradigm to enable us to see our environment as a unified
system of integrally related parts.
Previous to the development of this ecological paradigm, many scientists
presented a worldview of atomistic and separate parts, so it made sense to understand
moral issues in terms of competing and clashing rights between individuals. Ecology
shows us that the ecological community is integrated and Leopold encourages us to
extend that knowledge to morality, realising that the human community too works best
when all parts are integrated. First, we are encouraged to recognize that we have
responsibilities and duties toward each other in the human community. Next Leopold
reminds us that the unity of the biotic environment also requires us to consider our duties
to animals and the environment. If ethics in general imposes limitations on our individual
freedoms of action towards others, then "An environmental ethic would impose
limitations on human freedom of action in relationship to nonhuman entities and to nature
as a whole," (Callicott, 1994,1).
As described by Leopold, morality is based on the beauty, integrity, and stability
of the community. Individuals are valued in terms of what they contribute to the whole.
Moral standing is extended not only to animals but also to inanimate objects such as
trees, swamps, and mountains, with the criterion for value that of contribution of function
as part of the ecosystem.12
With its emphasis on contribution to the smooth functioning of the ecological
community and the subsequent diminished concern for the individual, the land ethic is
similar to utilitarianism and in like fashion it falters. The land ethic provides a holistic
rather than an individualistic perspective on morality. Emphasis on the good as that
which benefits the community means that the status of the individual is devalued and
value becomes secondary to usefulness. Value appears to be instrumental and worth is
considered in terms of how much an individual contributes to the ecological community.
Secondarily, within the land ethic a hierarchy of value is constructed. Not all
animals are viewed as having equal worth. For example, wild animals are valued over
tamed animals. Predators, who are fewer in number than preyed-upon species, are more
highly valued individually than are prey species. Where this value structure becomes
problematic for the individual is if the hierarchy is extended such that some animals are
seen as having no value at all. This unfortunately does happen; wild animals are valued
while domesticated animals are seen as pests or blights upon the land (Callicott, 1980).
Many environmental ethicists shun domestication as something that has robbed animals
of their natural wildness, beauty, and independence. Domestic animals are viewed as
disrupters of natural ecosystems (as are most humans) and therefore are valueless within
the land ethic. In this regard it must be stated that there are in existence no completely
wild ecosystems, untouched by the hand of humans, so defining value based on wild
versus domestic animals may be arbitrary. Since humankind's harnessing of fire we have
changed the land upon which we walk. Since we first tolerated wolves slinking near to
that fire, we have changed the animals we met. This view of the world proposed by many
environmental ethicists appears to be an ideal of wildness unfettered by reality. We must
consider humans and animals in the environment as it is now and ethics should reflect
this reality.
The importance of an ecocentric ethic is in its promotion of a worldview of
environmental interdependence and connection. Morality can then be viewed in terms of
relationship, a theme that will be revisited throughout this chapter.
Theological Biocentrism13
Jay McDaniel and Sallie McFague, among others, propose a Christian based
biocentric ethic. This is a life-centered position, not to be confused with ecocentrism,
which is an environmentally grounded philosophy. Biocentrism emphasizes the value of
animate beings (human and nonhuman animals and plants) while ecocentrism
encompasses inanimate entities as well (plants, rocks, air, and environments for
example). Biocentrists advocate a life-centered position in the world as an antidote to the
human-centered position of anthropocentrism, which is the more usual stance among
persons in our society. McDaniel states, "To be life-centered is to live out of a sense of
kinship with all life, not human life alone. It is to empathize with other living beings too"
(McDaniel, 1989,15). Adopting a biocentric perspective on our relationship with the
world and the creatures that dwell on it requires a profound shifting in attitude and
actions, but the results would prove revolutionary. Albert Schweitzer, father of the
"reverence for life" perspective writes, "Until he extends the circle of compassion to all
living things, man will not himself find peace" (Schweitzer in Webb, 1998,130).
McDaniel speculates that nurturing a biocentric attitude may be the way to finding that
peace.
McDaniel suggests three moral virtues to assist in developing a more biocentric
lifestyle. These are, first, the adoption of an "inward disposition that is respectful of and
caring for other animals, plants, and the earth and that refuses to draw a sharp dichotomy
between human life and other forms of life" (McDaniel, 1989, 73). He terms this virtue
"reverence for life". The second virtue is non-harm, ahimsa, towards others. The third
virtue is active good will. It is not enough to do no harm; one should actually do good. He
points out that the World Council of Churches in 1983 highlighted three further values
necessary for modern Christians to incorporate into their lives. These are attention to
peace, justice, and the integrity of creation. McFague fills out the meaning of the last
phrase by explaining that "The value of all creatures in and for themselves, for one
another, and for God, together constitute the integrity of creation" (Mc Fague, 1993,165).
Recognition of the intrinsic value of all life is the foundation of a biocentric
perspective. McDaniel espouses a Christian based biocentrism, in that he believes that
God is the original source of value. God created life, he states, but once created this life
has value in itself, as something independently valuable. In Genesis 1:21 God, aftercreating animals on the fifth day, sees they are good. McDaniel calls this the "initial
recognition of intrinsic value" (McDaniel, 1989, 68).
McDaniel proposes that not all life forms have equal intrinsic value. He criticizes
the view held by other biocentric advocates that all life contains intrinsic value in equal
proportions. Nor does he agree with biocentric Christians who believe that all life,
because it comes from God and is an expression of God, is equal in intrinsic value, a
view he terms "egalitarian monism". The example is provided of our own estimation of
human value as higher than bacterial value when we do the simple act of washing our
faces, thereby wiping out millions of bacterial lives. In practicality we are proving we
believe ourselves to have higher intrinsic value than bacteria (1989, 75).
McDaniel utilizes ideas from process philosophy to advance his biocentric
theology. Process philosophy or theology is a radical new perspective on the nature of
reality, combining concepts from quantum physics, evolutionary theory, and ecology
with religion. The foundational idea of this philosophy is that organisms are never
completely independent of other organisms or their environment. "An organism of any
sort is a highly integrated and dynamic pattern of interdependent events. Its parts are
modified by the unified activity of the whole. Every event occurs in a context that affects
it," (Barbour, 2000, 116). Process philosophy can be instrumental in assisting us with the
task of grading intrinsic value. McDaniel states that it does this by helping to define the
reality, nature, and range of subjectivity. Process theology teaches that the subject does
not have experiences, but rather is composed of experiences. Life consists of momentary
pulses of subjective experiences and these can be had by both living cells and those
things made up of, at the submicroscopic level, pulsations of energy. "The entire cosmos
is alive with subjectivity, with aims and interests, and hence with intrinsic value"
(McDaniel, 1989, 76).
Process theology divides all forms of life into two categories, monarchically
organized organisms and democratically organized organisms. A dog is a monarchically
organized organism whereas the ringworm fungus,Trichophyton,growing on the dog is a
democratically organized organism. A monarchy is composed of both a body and a
psyche. The psyche is the stream of experiences lived by the organism, the unifying
principle of a being, what some call the spirit, self, or soul. This type of organism is a15
subject-of-a-life. Not all monarchical organisms contain the same amount of soul. Depth
of soul depends on how well the organism learns from experiences and develops an
identity over time (interestingly, a concept similar to philosopher Tom Regans criteria
for possession of inherent value) and how richly this entity experiences events. A
democratically organized organism does not have a "presiding psyche" (1989, 78). It is a
collection of energy events without a unifying core of being.
McDaniel uses process theology to assist in ranking degree of intrinsic value in
individuals. Both monarchically and democratically organized organisms contain some
amount of intrinsic value, as creatures made by God, but not all possess it equally.
Intrinsic value is composed of experiential richness and self-concern. Richness is made
up of events of harmony and intensity. Harmony is defined as "a general feeling of
attunement, balance, accord and affinity" (1989, 80). It may be found in relation to our
selves, other beings, with ideas, or in God. McDaniel proposes compassion as the highest
form of harmony. Intensity is defined as "energetic vitality in relation to other beings"
(1989, 81). Organisms that have the capacity for greater degrees of harmony and intensity
have greater intrinsic value. We can rank degree of intrinsic value when aided by two
assumptions: monarchies can enjoy greater experiential richness than democracies and
increasingly complex nervous systems lead to increased intensity of experiences. Thus
the dog has greater intrinsic value than the fungus on the dog. These assumptions
however must be tempered by the reminder that all creatures have some degree of
intrinsic value and the reminder that every creature regards its own life and interests as
central. The fungus on the dog, if it can view itself, believes it is more valuable than the
dog and it is interested in promoting its own survival.
Whether or not process philosophy settles the debate as to the origin and degree of
intrinsic value, this theory provides, in common with environmental ethics and care
ethics, further recognition of the importance of the interconnections between all
organisms. It emphasizes that relationships are crucial and are indeed a critical aspect of
all living beings.
Sally McFague works within the Christian biocentric perspective as well. Her views
are similar to McDaniel in that she advocates a lessening of anthropocentrism with aconsequential deepening relationship and reconciliation with the natural world. In The
Body of God (1993) she proposes that God can be appreciated in animals and nature,
which are God's embodied reflections. Moreover, because of this every creature and
every body has intrinsic value. McFague writes that Jesus must be welcomed back into
the picture, as his teachings can lead us to this deeper relationship with all of creation.
The life and stories of Jesus show us that God's love is all encompassing. Jesus lived and
advocated for the poor, the oppressed, and the outcasts. His parables highlight the radical
philosophy of compassion and caring. The teachings of Jesus suggest liberation from the
dualities seen in our society, those of male! female, rich! poor, humanity!nature, to name
just a few.
McFague suggests that there is a new poor, and that is nature. Nature (including all
animals) has been chained to work for us; we see nature in terms of instrumental value,
rather than intrinsic value. McFague contends that humanity must take responsibility for
the oppression and destruction of the natural world. She states that selfishness is the
greatest sin, and salvation comes from remembrance of our proper place in the world.
Part of our duty then lies in healing what we have damaged. We need to stop destroying
the earth and take responsibility for its well-being. McFague writes, "the land and its
creatures have rights and are intrinsically valuable" (1993,187). She exhorts us to
recognize this and welcome all beings, including animals, to our table.
The theology described by McFague, with its emphases on the ecological community,
on Jesus as exemplar of compassion, and on the quest for healing, offers much wisdom
for our modern world. Although her focus is on the banishment of hierarchical dualities
she does touch on how that would affect human relationships with animals. She suggests
that we should represent the interests of "the truly voiceless ones on the planet, namely,
small children, all species of plants, and all animals except human beings," (1993,12).
Her persuasive argument resonates with my feelings about God as not only transcendent,
but also very much alive and truly present in all creatures. McFague weaves a feminist
perspective into an ecological theology and presents a very palatable philosophy along
with a call to action. She challenges us to change our perspective and then act on that new
found knowledge. She does not address the animal issueper Se,but includes animals17
among the voiceless ones, those in need of advocates, and in that way encourages us to
change the way we both view and treat them.
Feminist Ethics
Proponents of feminist ethics begin with a critique of patriarchy, with its
emphasis on rationality, duality, and hierarchy, as being the cause of many problems in
society, from sexism, to environmental destruction, to war, to animal abuse. Feminists
have strongly identified with the Other, those not in power (non-white and non-male,
non-human) and from this identification have formed a philosophy radically different
from traditional Western ethics. In 1982 Carol Gilligan responded to Lawrence
Kohlberg's theory of the stages of moral development. Kohlberg concluded that men are
more advanced morally than women, therefore women suffer from arrested moral
development. Gilligan proposed instead that men and women develop different moral
perspectives; they speak with "different voices". There is a female moral voice and a
male moral voice, and these voices are not necessarily restricted to the sex they are
named for. That is, a male can morally speak in the female voice. Those speakers with a
male voice tend to develop a "justice perspective" based on abstract principles and
individual rights, while those with a female voice develop a "care perspective" with the
emphasis on relationships comprised of compassion, care, and cooperation (Tong, 1998).
Feminist theorists emphasize relationships as primary and stress that there should
be less focus on universalizable moral principles to guide our behavior and more focus on
context and emotion than is usually allowed for in Western philosophy. Concrete
situations and real life experiences matter and should be considered when we are making
decisions as to how we should act (Wennberg, 2003).
Although there is a diversity of feminist moral philosophies, Jean Grimshaw (Grimshaw,
1986 in Tong 1998) suggests these three features provide a common core:
1. A critique of abstraction, which is flawed by its tendency to look for universalizable
rules. Instead, feminist ethics give priority to an "ethic of particularity" that focuses
on individuals with their specific needs.lI
2. The contextualization of ethical thought: concrete situations and real life experiences
count and should be considered when making moral decisions. This is accomplished
with close, attentive scrutiny, and then analysis, of each situation faced.
3. An emphasis on caring and compassion in moral relationships.
The Ethic of Care
Feminist philosopher Ne! Noddings pioneered the field of Care-Ethics, with the
book Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (first published in
1984) in which she argues that morality arises out of the desire "to be and remain
related," (Noddings, 2003,83). Relationships are formed because the person we care
about makes a difference to our life. We will treat that person with care because we want
to be connected. The longing for ongoing connections influences our behaviour toward
that person; thus we will tend to act morally. "The desire to be good is a natural
derivative of the desire to be related" (2003, 151).
Natural caring is sparked by memories of being cared for. Noddings suggests that
humans naturally care for certain beings; she provides the example of a mother who
naturally cares for her child. As Noddings reasons, natural caring alone does not provide
solid ground for a basis of morality. Natural caring, she argues, is not enough. Ethical
caring is needed to transfer feelings into right actions. Moreover, Noddings states, our
inclination to behave morally is born of natural caring and in this caring we seek
reciprocity. This reciprocity is not the same type as described by contractarians, whereby
reciprocity is characterized by mutuality, but it is rather characterized by what she terms
completion.
Noddings refutes the utilitarian view that animals are interchangeable, and that
together they make a class. She acknowledges that each individual animal is different and
the situations leading to encounters with different animals influence whether or not we
develop a caring relationship with that particular animal. She does not, however, believe
humans can develop ethical relationships with animals by transitioning from the state of
natural caring to ethical caring, as we do in human relationships. Noddings argues that
ethical relationships require reciprocity with completion, which she believes is beyond
the scope of an animal's range of responses, "We can see clearly that animals are notcapable of entering a mutually or doubly caring relation with human beings..."
(2003,159). She does not argue for the extension of natural caring towards one animal
outward to include all animals.
While I endorse many of Noddings' notions about care and an ethic based in
relationships her theory seems inadequate in many respects. While I agree that
obligations arise out of a desire to conform to an ideal moral version of self and that
attainment of that goal leads a person from natural to ethical caring, I disagree with the
limitation on caring that Noddings prescribes. I propose a more generous caring response
whereby the inclination to care is nurtured and the caring attitude expanded, so that the
caring response is practiced within many types of relationships without losing its force.
Noddings focuses her ethics of care on relationships with inherent power
differences. When she discusses relationships she is referring to those in which one party
is a caregiver and the other is the care receiver, or one is the teacher and the other is the
student. These relationships are important to discuss in terms of morality but in focusing
on them she loses sight of those relationships based in equality rather than imbalance.
Likewise, although I heartily agree with Noddings that every animal is an
individual and that the circumstances of encounter influence our actions toward each one,
I disagree that we cannot be in moral relationships with them. I think many persons are
already involved in ethically sound relationships with animals. Noddings' definition and
requirement of reciprocity characterized by completion as required for ethical
relationships seems artificial and puts constraints on what many of us feel to be
wonderfully rewarding and ethically sound relationships, those we have with our pets and
those we feel, by extension, with other animals.
The ethic of caring, as described by Nel Noddings, does provide a new
perspective on the basis of morality. Rather than placing the onus of our behaviour on the
principles of utility or justice she grounds morality in relations and the character of
caring. The value of this paradigm shift is that it provides a new way of thinking about
and interacting with others.
Ecofeminist Karen J.Warren proposes her own version of the ethics of caring. She
suggests that moral relationships be based on an ethic founded on care, but her building
blocks are slightly different than those in Noddings. I find value in Warren's alternative20
view of a caring relationship and the implications arising from it. Where Noddings began
with "caring for" Warren starts with "caring about". What differentiates the second from
the first is that "Caring about another is the expression of a cognitive capacity, an attitude
toward the cared-about as deserving respectful treatment, whether or not one has any
particular positive feelings for the cared-about" (Warren, 2000, 110). She is describing
the caring attitude of a moral person, a vision akin to Noddings' ideal version of self.
Warren proposes that the caring person does not need reciprocity from the cared-
about in order to be in a relationship. In fact, the cared about does not even have to be
alive. Warren describes an experience in which she learned to care about the mountain
she was climbing and in this way, developed a relationship with it. She tells of listening
to the voices of the birds, the water trickling on the rock. She feels the rock under her
hands, the lichen, and the crannies. She begins to speak to the rock, as if it were her
friend. She feels gratitude to the rock for giving her the opportunity to know herself in
this new way, and describes a sense of being in a relationship with the natural
environment. "It felt as if the rock and I were silent conversational partners in a
longstanding friendship" (2000, 103). She came to care about the rock. A reciprocal
relation, so important to Noddings' ethic of care, is not so easily defined in this case, and
according to Warren is not necessary.
Warren outlines three aspects of care: I .Caring about may or may not involve
caring for the other 2. Reciprocity is not a condition for caring about 3. Care and caring
are processes, not events (Warren, 2000, 141). The process of caring can be divided into
phases, and I will relate these (as Warren does) in terms of our relations with animals.
The first is "caring about" something or someone. This is also described as "loving
perception". The moral person can learn about animals, becoming considerate of their
needs and welfare. The second phase is "taking care of' another, and this step involves
recognition of our responsibilities towards the other being. Warren writes that these
responsibilities are not necessarily duties nor do they stem from rights, but nonetheless
they are important to consider. This step correlates fairly well to Noddings' suggestion to
look towards the ethical ideal and move into ethical caring. "Care giving" is the third
phase and it necessitates putting into practice the caring process by doing what we can to
enhance the well being of animals. This correlates to "caring for" others. The last phase is21
"care receiving" which means the animal should receive the care it needs on its own
terms, that is care stemming from an understanding of the animal as a being enmeshed in
complex relationships (2000, 142). The last phase includes the stipulation that the animal
be capable of responding to human care practices. This step is close to Noddings'
definition of the cared-for, but differs in the lack of requirement for completion in the
cared-for's response.
Unlike Noddings', Warren's version of relationship is not defined by a power
difference, that of one party caring for the other. Rather it seems to suggest that there can
be relationships based on altruism or interest, with an acceptance of differences in
reciprocity far greater than is seen in Noddings' ethic of care. Warren's alternative
definition of relationship holds promise for expanding the ethics of care beyond the
human realm.
In the passage below Warren sums up what I believe is the most important idea
encompassed by her version of the ethic of care. In these few sentences she emphasizes
what differentiates care ethics from all the other philosophies advocating moral
consideration of animals, the recognition that caring for animals matters morally. Warren
writes of this embodied understanding, and the epiphany experienced as she swam in the
ocean with dolphins.
I also came to see things differently during that swim. At one point I turned to a
calf swimming by my side and began voicing what was for me a profound
realization. Looking directly in each other's eyes, 1 said to the calf," Evenif you
are sentient, capable of language and communication, rational, arights-holder,
deserving of respect and protection-even f all this is true, which I believe it is-
that's not what is morally basic. What is morally basic is that we care about you
(2000, 121).
Animal Rights
The last section in this chapter focuses on the most individualistic philosophical
system, rights theory. Tom Regan's philosophy of animal rights based on inherentvalue
is outlined and contrasted with Andrew Linzey' s theologically based animal rights
philosophy.Invocation of rights language presupposes an adversarial relationship between
those with more power and those with less or none. It has been successfully used to argue
for attainment of equal legal rights for African Americans, women, and homosexuals in
our society and is now being used to argue for the respectful treatment of allanimals. The
theory of rights addresses a major problem inherent in utilitarianism, that of the happiness
of the many overriding the legitimate interests of the few. Individuals do matter in rights
theory. Unfortunately, animals have enforceable rights only if they are granted these
rights by humans. As philosopher Stephen Webb states "Animals do not have a sense of
their own moral claims on each other or on us. Even if the rights of animals are inscribed
by law and enforced by the state, animals will still be dependent on us to voluntarily limit
and alter our power over them and to go out of our way to protect and nurture them"
(Webb, 1998, 42).
Tom Regan uses the term inherent value to make his case for animal rights. In The
Case for Animal Rights (1983) Regan proposes that animals should be included within
the moral community as possessors of moral rights. He argues that not only humans but
also nonhuman animals possess inherent value, which entitles the bearer the right to be
treated with respect, and not merely as means to an end. He argues that the ways in which
we use animals, e.g. for food, fiber, and research, violates this right, is morally wrong,
and should cease. Regan writes, "These animals are our psychological kin. Like us, they
bring to their life the mystery of a unified psychological presence. Like us, they are
somebodies, not somethings. In these fundamental ways, they resemble us. In this
fundamental sense, all subjects-of-a-life are equal because all equally share the same
moral status" (Cohen and Regan, 2001, 210).
Regan explains the difference between inherent value and intrinsic value in this
way, "To say that inherent value is not reducible to the intrinsic values of anindividual's
experiences means that we cannot determine the inherent value of individual moral
agents by totaling the intrinsic values of their experiences" (Regan, 1983, 235). This
means that individuals with inherent value are more than just compilations of their
qualities or experiences, they are valuable beyond that, valuable in their own right.
Traditionally inherent value has been applied only to moral agents (i.e., humans with
subject-of-a-life capacities) and not to moral patients (such as humans in persistent23
vegetative states, embryos, or animals). Moral agents are those individuals who have the
ability to "bring impartial moral principles to bear on the determination of what, all
considered, morally ought to be done and, having made this determination, to freely
choose or fail to choose to act as morality, as they conceive it, requires" (1983,151). In
contrast moral patients do not have the abilities that enable them to conceive of moral
principles or to act in ways that reflect morality.
Regan's argument is revolutionary in that that he expands the discussion of
inherent value to include not only moral agents (rational human beings) but also moral
patients (in which group he includes animals). He proposes that since moral agents
possess inherent value then they cannot be treated as mere collections of intrinsically
valuable experiences or qualities. Each individual with inherent value possesses this
quality equally; therefore all must be treated equally if justice is to be provided for. If
inherent value is not composed of the sum of intrinsic values then an individual cannot
have more or less inherent value than another individual.
He proposes that the possession of the capacity for rationalism or morality should
not be the criterion for determining inherent value. Inherent value is derived, he states,




4. A sense of one's own future
5. An emotional life
6. The ability to experience pain and pleasure
7.Preference and welfare interests
8.The ability to initiate action in pursuit of desires and goals
9. A psycho-physical identity over time
Regan applies these characteristics to animals and argues that these capacities indicate
that animals are "subjects-of-a-life". As subjects-of-a-life they have inherent value. As
possessors of such, animals are beings with moral status (1983, 243).
Next Regan argues that the restriction of inherent value to moral agents alone is
arbitrary. All beings fulfilling subject-of-a-life criteria possess inherent value equally. Put24
another way, moral agents do not possess more inherent value than moral patients do.
Human animals are not more inherently valuable than nonhuman animals. In Regan's
words "All who have inherent value have it equally, whether they be moral agents or
moral patients"(1983, 240).In other words, inherent value is an all or none quality, either
a being has it or the being doesn't and it is unethical and unjust to suggest that rights be
granted only to those who are moral agents. A hamster therefore has as much inherent
value as a dog or a human has. Put simply, all beings with inherent value possess it
equally and all "have an equal moral right to treatment respectful of their value,"(1983,
266).In consideration of animals this translates to mean that all organisms fulfilling
subject-of-a-life criteria have inherent value and therefore have moral rights.
Theos-Rights
While Tom Regan argues that animals possess moral rights based on inherent value
because they are subjects-of-a-life, Andrew Linzey, a pioneering animal theologian,
claims that animals have theos-rights based on their God granted intrinsic value. "Animal
creation should be the subject of honour and respect because it is created by God"
(Linzey,1995,3).
Linzey believes that even if there were a fundamental theological distinction between
human and nonhuman animals it would be irrelevant when considering whether or not
animals should be treated respectfully. He states that God does not prefer one part of
creation above another; God is not anthropocentric. Linzey advises us to "abandon our
sharp, sometimes arrogant, separation of humankind from nature" (1995,10).
Linzey proposes that humans do have responsibilities toward animals. This is in
contrast to more traditional Christian teachings, going back to Thomas Aquinas, whereby
animals are seen in terms of their usefulness to humans and our duties to animals are
indirect. Linzey argues that not only do humans have responsibilities to animals but
moreover those animals have the right to our responsibility and reverence. He considers
and dismisses in turn rationality, personhood status, and sentience as criteria for the
possession of rights, arguing that a purely secular basis for rights is problematic in itself:
"it is only God who can properly and absolutely claim them"(1995, 22). Bythis he
means that no rational, secular criterion can be the foundational basis of a right; rights25
must come from somewhere, they must be granted by someone. Linzey states that God is
the germinal source of rights. Rights arise from being valued and as God is the ultimate
judge of value, God is also the ultimate source of rights.
At the heart of Linzey's theory that animals are deserving of rights is his belief that a
theocentric orientation to all creation is necessary. An orientation such as he describes
requires the understanding of several proposals. The first is that "Creation existsfor God'
(1995, 24). The world was made by God for God. By this Linzey means that the world
was not made solely for humans and that animals were not put on the earth merely to
serve us. Next Linzey writes, "God is for creation" (1995, 24) which means simply that
God is not indifferent to creation, but loves and values it. As part of creation we are
valuable and God is on our side. Likewise as God created the animals, God values them
and is on their side too. Combining these components leads to Linzey's conclusion that if
humans are to respect God then we must also respect all that has been created, as God
respects and loves all creation.
Linzey proposes that animals possess rights derived from God, which he calls "theos-
rights". His argument has been summarized into three main points. The first is that God is
the basis for all rights. God created everything in the world and has the right to have these
creations respected. Secondly, those creatures that are Spirit-filled, breathing, and made
of flesh and blood are inherently valuable to God. Finally, these creatures can make a
claim on us that is no less than God's claim upon us (Wennberg, 2003).
Key to Linzey's philosophy is the underlying recognition of an ongoing and dynamic
relationship between God and all creation. "God's affinnation of creation is not a once-
and-for-all event but a continual affirmation, otherwise it would simply cease to be,"
(1995, 25). This is similar to the quality of God's immanence as described by Sally
McFague and the dynamic God portrayed in McDaniel's process philosophy.
At first reading it may seem that there is a bewildering gulf between Regan's secular
and Linzey's theological accounts of value. The basis for rights is different; Regan's
focuses on the value of the subject's inner life, while Linzey's appeals to God's
assignment of value to the subject. Further investigation however reveals that these
theories have a stunning commonality, which is that animals fulfilling inherent value
criteria and theos-rights holders are one and the same . Although the foundation for thez'1
rights differs, both theories hold that animals are valuable in and for themselves and are
thus worthy of our respect.
McDaniel's and McFague's biocentric theologies and Linzey's theos-rights philosophy
share a spiritual outlook on creation. They advocate a radical paradigm shift away from
anthropocentrism and towards a more balanced and less selfish consideration of the
world, in which humans interact with respect or reverence with all.
A striking feature of this overview of the various philosophies and theologies
addressing the moral consideration of animals is that all treat animals as a monolithic
category. The diversity of animals is absent from the conversation. There is virtually no
acknowledgement of the myriad of animal categories, wild, domestic, companion,
mammal, bird, or reptile. The range of these philosophies is too broad, while the focus is
too limited in scope. The theories do not describe how we should interact positively with
animals, but instead narrow in on prohibitions on actions and interactions. Foe example,
Stephen Webb argues that rights language limits too narrowly the relationships we form
with our pets. "Rights cannot do justice to our relationships with pets, which are
governed by acts of love and not the protection of mutually recognized self-interests.
Rights provide minimal warrants for protection from each other; they do not encourage
attentive gestures of affection and attachment" (Webb,1998, 40).27
CHAPTER THREE
THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL GROUNDING OF THE HUMAN-DOG BOND
This chapter addresses the anthropological evidence for the human-dog bond and
attempts to show that this relationship is the result of a long historyof favourable
interactions between both species. I explain briefly the process of domestication and then
follow this with an examination of the process of dog domestication. As the
domestication of dogs is inherently connected to their evolution, this I also describe both
in terms of physical and cultural development. I propose that dogs have value that is in
addition to the intrinsic value that should be granted to all animals; dogs have relational
value and evidence for this value is provided in this chapter. The chapter closes by
emphasizing the relevance of the human-dog bond as a principle for guiding our
interactions with dogs, a species with which we share our history and for which we have
the obligation to care for.
Canines and humans have interacted for a very long time. Wolves and humans
lived side by side for aeons before evidence of domestication appears in the
archaeological record. The human-canine bond may have its beginnings in a loose
association between wolves and people, with both species benefiting from the
relationship. This is not hard to understand as wolves and humans both live communally
within hierarchical groups where sharing and cooperative behaviours are vital for
survival. Both species are medium sized omnivorous hunters and scavengers so their
ecological niches overlapped and the two species most likely encountered each other at
nearly every type of site where food was found. As wolves follow ravens to kill sites, so
they may have followed humans, and humans may have followed wolves, competing for
and benefiting from each other's skill.
Domestication
It is the long history of interwoven relationships arising from domestication that
gives dogs part of their relational value. Domestication was the second step, after
association, taken towards initiating a deeper and more complex relationship between28
dogs and humans. The concept of domestication is somewhat contentious and there are
two main contrasting perspectives on the nature of the domestic relationship.
Domestication may be viewed as subjugation: a relationship based on a power
differential, with a more powerful party dominating a relatively powerless party. The
inequality inherent in this type of domestic relationship can lead to abuse, such as that
seen on factory farms, or can lead to the more appealing but also problematic type of
relationship seen in stewardship or paternalistic models of interaction. This view of
domestication calls for the need to use rights language in the advocacy of moral
consideration of animals.
The alternative perspective of domestication is to see it as a partnership between
two parties, as in a good marriage, wherein both parties consent to the relationship and
derive satisfaction from it. There may be a power difference but it is the backdrop rather
than the focus of the interactions and what matters most is that both parties benefit. It is
this paradigm of domestication that I am exploring in the context of the human-dog
relationship. This view of domestication calls for use of the language of relationality, as
used in the ethic of care.
Prehistorians have divided the human cultural past into categories based on tool
types and subsistence patterns. The Paleolithic began around 2.6 million years ago
(although this date is a subject of much controversy currently as new finds arise) in East
Africa and is thought to have lasted until approximately 14,000 years ago. This period
covers the majority of human existence. Stone provided the main survival material,
although plant and animal products were also used. People were foragers who hunted and
gathered for food (Conroy 1997, Hall 2003). The Mesolithic is a period of transition at
the end of the last glaciation and it is during this time that the bow and arrow appeared
and regional differences in resource use occurred. Generally it has been accepted that this
is when human and dog interdependence began, although this idea is under scrutiny. The
Neolithic translates as the "new stone age" because this period is defined by the
appearance of grinding stones used for grain processing, but the actual social and
subsistence definition of the Neolithic is the dawning of agriculture, with small farming
villages and more controlled use of resources. The Neolithic period may have emerged as
long as 11, 000 years ago in some areas, the Middle East in particular (Hall, 2003).The domestication of animals coincides with the Neolithic revolution. As humans
became increasingly more sedentary and began to use agriculture to support aburgeoning
population, our relationships with animals (and indeed the natural environment as a
whole) changed. The world was divided into those parts we can use,control, and own
versus those parts we consider wild anduntamable. For the most part the domesticated
animals and plants were valued for their usefulness as property whilethe wilderness was
appreciated for qualities apart from utility. I suggest that with the adventof domestication
humans began to see animals as possessing value in terms of theirusefulness and lost
sight of their value apart from utility.
Historically domestication was viewed as a static event. However, more recently
domestication is described as a dynamic interaction between groups mutuallyaffecting
each other. We owe this new perception to Frederick Zeuner, a zoologistand
palaeontologist writing in the 1960s, who first defined domestication as a "biologically
defined symbiotic relationship" (Zeuner 1963, Harris 1996). EvolutionistDavid Rindos
defines domestication as a co-evolutionary process by which both groupsenhance their
reproductive fitness (Harrisl996). Domestication may also be described in more
anthropocentric terms as a process whereby succeeding generations of tamed animals
gradually become absorbed into human societies, eventually becoming estrangedfrom
their original wild ancestors. This process may be seen as one in which a symbiotic
relationship develops, that is, both groups "choose" to associate with each other as a
survival strategy (Clutton-Brock, 1999).
The Stages of Domestication
Zeuner outlined five stages of intensity of animal domestication. These stages
included:
1.Loose contact between humans and animals, with free breeding between theanimals
2.Confinement of animals to the human environment, with captive breeding
3.Selective breeding of animals, organized by humans to obtain specific desired
qualities
4. Planned development of breeds of animals for purposes of humaneconomic
consideration5.Extermination or persecution of wild animal ancestors (1963).
As noted in Zeuner's classification system, domestication involves aspects of both
animal husbandry and utilization. Feminist anthropologist Jacqueline Milliet argues that
it is a synchronic phenomenon requiring constant interactions and modifications.
Domestication involves not only economic consideration, but also fulfills emotional,
ritual and symbolic functions. She reminds us that there are three factors that humans
control for domestic animals and these are feeding, protection, and reproduction
(conditions that wild animals control for themselves) (Milliet 2002).
It is important to note that domestication always involves two species. My claim is
that neither one can remain unchanged by the relationship. As in mathematics, when one
element in an equation changes so must the other elements change. Similarly, we cannot
transform a species without being somehow altered ourselves.
Physical and Cultural Aspects of Domestication
Domestication is wrought by both physical and cultural processes. The physical
process of evolution begins when animals are removed from their original wild
companions and are modified biologically, first genotypically then phenotypically. These
starter animals are termed the founder group and are either selectively bred for certain
traits or physically altered through natural selection (which is shaped by their new
environment and their interactions with the human community within which they live)
(Clutton-Brock, 1999). Culturally, domestication begins with ownership of an animal.
The animal must be claimed by an individual or group of individuals in order to be
incorporated into the human society; following this claim of ownership the animal may
be used in negotiations of barter, exchange, or inheritance (Clutton-Brock, 1999). As
domestication is connected with economics and domestic animals are valued as property,
and ownership is conceived as a relation between persons (subjects) and things (objects),
then domestication can be construed as appropriation of part of nature (Ingold, 1994).
Humans became separated from the natural world by their claim upon it as property.
Dog Evolution and Domestication31
Two recent reports in Science indicate that the domestication of dogs occurred
first in the Old World. Peter Savolainen and his colleagues compared mitochondrial DNA
samples from654domestic dogs, representing all extant breeds, with the mtDNA from
38 Eurasian wolves. With cladographic analysis they hypothesize that the first dogs were
domesticated from wolves in East Asia between15000-40 000 years ago (Savolainen et
al, 2002).
Ancestral humans began to utilize and profoundly alter nature for their own
purposes. Humans started to shape their futures rather than just exist within them. As
humans exerted an increasingly higher level of control over the environment we altered
our culture, and as our culture changed it evolved to include and to depend on domestic
animals. Dog domestication enabled early modern humans to hunt more successfully;
with dogs men could fell larger animals and in greater numbers. Families and herd
animals could be protected and the home areas could be kept free of refuse (garbage
dispersal becomes a new problem seen with increased sedentism). Moreover, with the
advent of agriculture, it has been argued, humans began to see themselves more in the
role of protector of property and less in the role of aggressive hunter (Reed, 1984).
Humans allowed animals into our villages, then into our homes, and into our families.
We began to have dogs as friends. The human-dog bond developed with domestication
and what began as a loose association between species became an important relationship
bringing the two communities much closer together.
Dog evolution is inextricably tied to human cultural evolution, with association
between the two species possibly preceding domestication by over one hundred thousand
years. It has generally been accepted that the relationship between dogs and humans
began in the Mesolithic, when men hunted alongside wolves. Recent genetic data
suggests that the relationship may have arisen during the Paleolithic, as some wolves
were exploring the new niche provided by their interactions with humans (Vila et al,
1997).
Coyotes, red wolves, foxes, jackals, and grey wolves have all been suggested as
likely candidates for being the wild ancestor of the domestic dog, either solely or in some
combination. The European Grey Wolf was thought to be the most obvious progenitor
and a study of genetic data confirming that dogs evolved from the grey wolf was32
published in Science in 1997. Vila et al analyzed mitochondrial DNA from 162 wolves
from sites all over the world and 140 dogs representing 67 breeds. They found much
similarity between gene sequences of dogs and wolves, much more so than between dogs
and coyotes, or dogs and jackals (the other postulated ancestors of dogs). There was so
much similarity that the authors of the study came to the conclusion that wolves are the
ancestors of domestic dogs. More significant to this chapter is that the authors foundthe
gene sequence divergence between dogs and wolves to besuch as to imply that dogs
became genotypically distinguishable from wolves approximately 135 000 years ago.
This supports the theory that wolves were on their way to becoming dogs genetically
before they became physically distinguishable domestic dogs. This date of 135 000 B.P.
needs further verification, however, as it suggests a much earlier date than other DNA
studies provide. The genetic evidence is corroborated somewhat by one site in the
archaeological record. Bones of wolves have been found in association with humans
dating to at least 125 000 years ago at La Grotte du Lazaret in France, where wolf skulls
were apparently placed at the entrance of Paleolithic shelters(Thurston, 1996). Thus the
ancient, long-standing association between wolf-dogs and humans is supported, but by no
means confirmed, both by molecular biology and archaeology.
A second study published in the same journal, Science, provides further evidence
that supports an Old World origin of domestic dogs and documents the importance of
dogs in human society. Mitochondrial (Mt) DNA was extracted from the remains of 37
canines from archaeological sites across Mexico, Peru, and Bolivia (pre-Columbus era).
These samples were compared with mtDNA from 140 modern dogs representing a
diverse selection of breeds and mtDNA from 259 wolves. A phylogenetic tree was
constructed with the results indicating that all domestic dogs originated from Old World
grey wolves. The authors surmise that those early peoples represented atthe dig sites in
migrating to the New World brought with them dogs arising from multiple, previously
established lineages. This suggests a very long relationship between humans and their
dogs (Leonard et al, 2002). For example, the ancestors oftoday!s Native Americans,
crossing the Bering land bridge or traveling along a coastal route about 12 000 years ago,
may have brought with them their already domesticated dogs tothe American continent.33
Evidence for the physical changes brought about by domestication of dogs is found
in many archaeological sites. The task of proving that domestication has occurred (i.e.
physical changes have been made to the domesticate by the domesticator) has been made
relatively straightforward with the provision of a checklist of characteristics indicating
morphologic distinctiveness between domestic dogs and their wild ancestors. There are
several criteria for differentiating early-domesticated dogs from their wild ancestors.
These can be summed up as; smaller body stature; a foreshortened skull with reduced
cranial vault and associated brain volume, and large teeth in relation to the jaw so that the
teeth appear compact, crowded, and rotated (Musil, 2000). Thus dogs have been
physically altered by domestication and as they entered a new niche their bodies adapted
to their new environment and roles.
Many archaeological excavations of habitation sites where dog remains are found
provide evidence of the physical changes brought about by domestication. Some such
sites, Kniegrotte Cave, Teufsbruke Cave, and Oelknitz in East Gennany for example,
represent temporary dwelling areas of Magdalenian hunters. These caves provide the
earliest evidence of canine domestication in Europe but evidence is scanty. For example,
Canis was represented by one individual in Kniegrotte cave. The maxilla fragment found
in Kniegrotte cave contained adult teeth with crowding noted between premolar2 and
premolar3. Tooth crowding is a trait seen with domestication of dogs. The maxilla is at
the small end of the size range spectrum for adult wolves found in the area. The toe
bones found at Teufsbrucke cave were also small in size. A distal humerus fragment,
distal tibia fragment, phalanges and metatarsal bones were recovered from Oelknitz cave,
and these were smaller and more gracile than typical wolf bones. Rudolf Musil's
hypothesis that these bones represent early-domesticated wolves, or Canis familiaris, is
based on the list of traits characteristic of domesticated dogs. He states that it is not mere
coincidence that the sites where "small wolves" or early domestic dogs were found are
the same sites where the most hunted animals were horses. The author concluded that
domestication of wolves appears to be correlated with the hunting of horses for food, as
the sites that yielded domestic dogs also yielded the greatest concentration of Eguus
bones (Musil, 2000).34
A recent report of archaeological evidence for dog domestication appears in
Current Anthropology. Sablin and Klopachev describe a site in central Russia, dating
from 13 000- 17 000 years BR Two canine skulls were found in association with the
remains of a dwelling made up of mammoth bones and a hearth. Also found were
mammoth ivory ornaments, female figurines made of limestone and bones carved with
geometrical designs characteristic of "Evolved Gravettian" culture. The canid skulls were
from adult animals, most closely resembling in size and shape Siberian huskies, differing
from them in being longer craniodorsally and having flatter and broader frontal bones.
The premolars are compacted, one of the criteria of domestication. Sablin and
Khlopachev argue that these Ice Age dogs were different enough from wolves and similar
enough to domestic large breed guard type dogs to infer domestication. They postulate
that the canids were domesticated (physically and culturally altered)in situfrom wolves.
Furthermore, they advocate the theory of coevolution, "The early dogs from Eliseevichi
may have played an important role in the development of human huntingtechnology and
strategy. In an environment in which wolves and humans were competing for food, it is
not difficult to surmise how an alliance could have been formed between them. Social
structures and behavior patterns are closely similar because both species evolved in
response to the needs of communal hunting" (Sablin and Khlopachev, 2002).
The Stages of Dog Domestication
Zeuner's outline of the stages of domestication is useful for describing the stages of
dog domestication. During the Paleolithic period, when humans were hunting,
scavenging and gathering, they shared an environmental niche with wolves. The two
species had much in common: both lived in socially cohesive small family groups, both
utilized open savanna and mixed forested terrain, and both hunted in packs as one alone
was not strong enough to bring down the large prey they favoured (Hall andSharp,
1978). This was the period of Stage One, loose contact with free breeding, which I call
the Association stage. The study by Vilaet alshows that even though wolves were still
wolves during this stage they were beginning to become genetically differentiable from
their wild kin. The wolves that associated with humans were evolving into the new niche
opened up by this relationship; perhaps the wolves hunting alongside men found different35
food sources available. Perhaps they were the wolves more tolerant of humans and thus
exhibited less stress when around us. Perhaps their modes of interaction with others of
their own species changed as they associated with us.
Dogs became not only genetically, but also physically, differentiable from
wolves, and this almost certainly arose as the animals were incorporated into the human
environment. Thus Stage Two probably began during the Neolithic Revolution as dogs
moved from merely associating with humans to playing a significant role in village life.
Certainly this move towards domestication benefited the dogs, as they are now found
dwelling within every human society, whereas wolves have been nearly exterminated
worldwide. The first domesticated dog remains were found in the Old World (Germany,
Israel, iraq and Siberia) dating from 12 000-14 000 years BP (Leonard, 2002; Savolainen,
2002; Sablin, 2002).
Certain behavioral traits of dogs have been emphasized with domestication This is
the category of Stage Three in Zeuner's system of domestication. Whether or not this
selection was done with intentionality by humans or is a product of the new niche dogs
occupied is subject to debate (Morey, 1994). However, characteristics such as tractability,
submission to the hierarchy, and sociability have enabled dogs to live within our culture.
Traits such as aggressiveness towards strangers, speed, strength, and protectiveness over
stock animals have been selected for when dogs are expected to guard sheep or homes or
to hunt with their owners. More recently in the history of dog domestication dogs have
been bred for specialized traits such as "going to ground", pointing, or lap sitting. Within
the past 120 years the species of dog has become subdivided into breeds, or lineages and
these breeds have been managed for economic and social gains (Stage Four). Dog shows
and dog breeding have become big business. The first kennel club was founded in the
1870s for the registry of purebred dogs. Today there are over 400 hundred recognized
breeds (Budiansky, 2000). Stage Five is the extermination of wild ancestors and this act
has been committed against the dog's closest ancestors, the wolves, in nearly every place
where wild wolves were once found.
The fact that dogs became dogs, and were no longer wolves, is evidence that
humans altered the evolution of the canid lineage. Humans have been agents of canine
physical and cultural change. In fact, domestic dogs are physically and culturally36
differentiable from their wild ancestors. The close association with dogs has also changed
humans. Evolutionarily dogs were agents of human cultural change, enabling humans to
interact in new ways with their environment and with other humans. The adoption of
dogs into human communities brings about changes to the culture, allowing people to
hunt bigger and faster game, protect themselves and their domestic stock against wild
animals, develop competitive sports involving dogs, travel farther afield, and interact
with animals and thus nature in a new way.
In a similar manner, humans have changed the culture of dogs with the process of
domestication. The term culture is not used often in terms of animal societies, but if we
define culture from a nonanthropocentric perspective, paring it down to its basic
components it appears logical to use it to describe certain aspects of canine communities.
Anthropologists Sharp and Hall defined two crucial components of culture. These are 1)
the presence of learned and flexible social patterns and 2) learned communication
interactions among members of the group. Moreover, they state that the essence of
culture is that the individual is embedded within the system. That is, the culture exists
before and after the individual's life and it is culture that shapes the worldview of its
members (Hall and Sharp, 1978). Zooarchaeologist Clutton-Brock defines culture in
terms of domestication "as a way of life imposed over successive generations on a society
of humans or animals by its elders. Where the society includes both humans and animals
then the humans act as the elders" (Clutton-Brock, 1999). Dogs have adapted so
integrally into our societies that we see evidence of them all over the world in virtually
every human community. They have learned how to fit in seamlessly in a multitude of
human cultures, so much so that they no longer fit into wild canid society. The dog has
been so thoroughly enculturated into human society that we now contemplate their
having moral rights, being granted "personhood status" and discuss the possibility of
legal rights.
The Human - Dog Bond
Dogs are emphatically good at interacting with humans and this skill helps
perpetuate the strong bond between their species and ours. The November 2002 issue of
Science contains an article elucidating the unique ability of dogs, among nonhuman37
animals, to read human visual cues. Eleven dogs, seven wolves, and eleven chimpanzees
were tested for the ability to find hidden sources of food. The food was hidden in such a
way that olfactory cues and memory could play no part in its detection. Human social
cues such as pointing, gazing, and tapping the bowl underneath which the food was
hidden, were used to locate the food. The results showed that the domesticated dogs
performed better than the chimps or the wolves in interpreting the human communication
cues. Dogs of all ages were good at the task and this did not vary with their history of
interactions with humans. The authors concluded that dogs did not inherit this skill from
wolves; neither did they learn it through intense socialization with humans at an early
age. This study provides evidence that dogs developed social and communication skills
with humans somewhere along their history of domestication. "Our conclusion is that as a
result of the process of domestication, some aspects of the social-cognitive abilities of
dogs have converged, with the phylogenetic constraints of the species, with those of
humans through a phylogenetic process of enculturation..." (Hare et al, 2002).
Several archaeological sites provide evidence of the close relationships between
dogs and humans. One such site is a Natufian tomb at Em Mallaha in northern Israel,
where the remains of a puppy were found placed under an elderly person's left hand. The
burial was dated at 9750-9350 BC. The close association between the human and dog
bones indicates "an affectionate rather than gastronomic relationship" (Davis, 1987).
The skeletal remains of three canids were excavated from Koster, an
archaeological site situated in the Illinois River Valley, Illinois. The site is located on an
alluvial and colluvial river fan and is composed of 25 prehistoric components,
representing continuous Holocene occupation by humans. The dog skeletons were found
in shallow, basin-shaped pits, which were well demarcated and only large enough to hold
the bones. Koster canid F 2256 had amano(handstone) and ametate(grinding tablet)
situated near its skull. The skeletons were complete and in correct anatomical position.
The bones showed no evidence of human modification; that is there were no scratch or
scrape marks, nor evidence of burning which implies that these dogs were not butchered
nor eaten. Radiocarbon dating was done on charcoal found in the burial pit associated
with canid F2256 and it was found to be 8 470 +1- 110 years BP in age. The authors state
that, based on the completeness of the remains and their location within pits, these canidswere deliberately buried (Morey and Wiant, 1992). The fact that one dog was buried with
a handstone and grinding tablet which were tools used by women for grinding grain may
provide evidence that the animals were regarded as part of the household. There is
speculation that while it was the men who used dogs for hunting, it may have been
women who instigated the more domestic relationship with dogs. A woman may have
found and fostered an orphaned pup and raised him within her home, thus initiating the
first companionable relationship between early humans and dogs.
Utilization of the model of domestication of dogs shapes our understanding of
humans' role within the environment. Viewing domestication as a mutually beneficial
process, inferring a symbiotic relationship between humans and dogs rather than a
unilateral and teleological one, places humans firmly within the environment rather than
outside of it. Humans may be understood as both agents of change and elements changed.
Likewise, wolves and dogs have actively participated in shaping our history. Our
interaction with wolves and our shaping of them into domestic partners changed the place
of humans in the world, and likewise irreparably changed the nature and world of
domesticated canines. The dog became a new type of creature, no longer wild and self-
reliant, but domesticated and now dependent on humans, with a history so intertwined
with ours as to be inseparable.
Animals have given up or lost their autonomy in the process of domestication.
Humans have taken control of their most basic aspects of life: reproduction, nutrition, and
protection. Domestic animals are dependent on their human owners for their survival. As
caretakers of our charges, and in response to their dependency, we should be responsive
to their needs and should engage in reciprocity equal to the gifts they have presented to
us.
The evidence provided by anthropological studies emphasizes the notion of
relationality. Humans and dogs have been interacting closely for thousands of years and
have mutually influenced each other's evolution during that time. Moreover, humans and
dogs have a history of close relationships. As the ethic of care is based on morality as
grounded in relationships this philosophy is the most appropriate for prescribing human
moral consideration of dogs.39
CHAPTER FOUR
CARING FOR DOGS
This chapter begins with a story about a man, his dog Elvis, and a third dog, a
stranger. The man and his dog enjoy many activities together; sometimes they hike, they
might backpack, and some days they just play ball. Elvis sleeps in the man's house at
night, protecting him from the dark. The man feeds his dog and keeps him healthy. They
are companions and have a mutually caring relationship.
When he meets a dog he has never met before, the man greets her with a friendly
gesture and an attitude of respect. If he saw a stray dog lying in the street, injured by a
car, he would try as best he could to help her. If he came upon someone abusing her he
would endeavor to stop the torment. He would feel an obligation to act on behalf of the
dog, even though he does not know her.
Why would this man feel obliged to stop and help the stray dog? He might
answer in this way; 1) He believes in the inherent worth of all animals and 2) He has
learned from the companionship he shares with his own dog that dogs are creatures who
are good at being in relationships. Moreover, he believes that relationshipswith dogs are
worthwhile and he recognizes that caring is an essential component of relationships 3)
thus he has extended the care he feels for his dog to a general attitude of caring for all
dogs, because he recognizes in them not only their inherent worth but also the potential
for relationship. 4) If he does not stop to help the stray dog he would be compromising
his character, his integrity as a caring individual.
It appears there are actually two sources of the obligation this man feels for the
stray dog. The first source arises from the relationship that he has with dogs, which
originated from a relationship with one specific dog and developed into a predisposition
towards developing relationships with dogs in general. The first source is the obligation
the man feels to care for dogs. The second source arises from the desire to live an
authentic life, true to an ideal image of self. The second obligation therefore is to himself.
This story illustrates how a caring attitude towards others, even those who are
strangers, arises from caring for those we know and love (those in our inner circle of
relationships), is nurtured by striving to attain the ethical ideal version of the self, and40
then is put into practice via ethical caring. It provides evidence that natural caring can
lead to the practical ethical action of caring for another.
By definition, dogs are connected to human society and they exist in and from
relationship to us. Our relationship with dogs is one of transcendence of self-interest or
utility; it is based on care and mutual giving. Care ethics focuses on connections and a
morality based on the desire to remain related. I have elaborated the ethic of care in order
to develop an ethic of moral consideration of animals using our relations with dogs as the
paradigmatic example.
Do we have an obligation to care about or for dogs? If so, why? Nel Noddings
proposes that moral persons have the obligation to care for those with whom they are in
relationship with. Karen J. Warren suggests that moral persons ought to care about and
then, perhaps, care for those entities with which they are in relationship. The foundation
for these two versions of care ethics is equivalent. Both are based on relationship, but in
certain definitions and details, such as the nature of relationship and how we might care,
they differ. I have formed my own response to the above questions using key elements
drawn from both versions in order to devise an ethic of care suitable for guiding a moral
person's interactions with dogs, our closest animal companion
The Ethic of Care - Noddings
Noddings' ethic of care provides the framework upon which care ethics is built,
so in this section I outline this philosophy as it relates to my thesis, moving fromthe
general theory to more specific ideas regarding human obligations to animals. As the care
ethic is grounded upon the nature of relationships that is where I begin.
Human relationships are many and various in type. Factors such as family ties,
intimacy level and commitment, proximity, shared interests, and circumstances all play
roles in our making decisions as to the types of relationships we form. If relationships can
be diagrammed, as Noddings proposes, as a series of concentric circles with oneself in
the center and ever-expanding circles around the center, then those with whom we form
the closest bonds are situated in the smallest circle, closest to the center. This is the inner
circle, in which "we care because we love" (Noddings 2003, 46). In this scheme the inner
circle usually includes our blood-related family and our closest friends. The next circle41
encompasses our acquaintances, our colleagues at work or school, and the members of
our religious or residential community, "those for whom we have personal regard"
(2003, 49). The next circle is comprised of those we know less well, such as the
receptionist at the dentist's office, the man who holds the flag at the road construction
site; people we may see every now and then, who aren't quite strangers but whom we
might never get to know any better than as just passing by. The people within these
circles are termed the "proximate others" (2003, 47). We treat persons in each circle
differently, depending on how closely we interact and how well we know them. We value
those in our inner circle more highly than those we hardly know or strangers whom we
will never meet. Noddings uses the metaphor of "chains" to describe our connections to
those people not yet encountered or to those outside the concentric circles of the known
entity. The chains extend from the proximate others within our circles to those people we
may encounter, such as a potential son-in-law or a future student. We are "prepared to
care" (2003, 47) for those people connected to us by these chains.
Within these relationships Noddings differentiates two types of caring, natural
and ethical. Neither type of caring is elevated above the other. Natural caring is born of
memories of being cared for. Noddings suggests that we naturally care for certain beings;
her primary example is of a mother who naturally cares for her child. From natural caring
arises the impulse to care for the other. Ethical caring then arises out of natural caring. It
is the "I must" that follows the original feeling of "I want" to care. We can channel this
natural inclination to care into an ethical response by accepting the challenge provided by
situations where the feeling is not so easily evoked. A father may naturally care for his
daughter, but he may not care naturally for his sister's son when the boy is throwing a
temper tantrum. Regardless of how the man feels at that moment he is obliged to care for
the boy, as he and the boy are in a close relationship, thus ethical caring must be invoked
so the man can calm the boy down.
Discipline is required to respond as one who cares when the impulse to care is
absent. According to Noddings when natural caring is impossible a person must rely on
self-discipline for commitment to the caring action and this is what transforms natural
caring into ethical caring. In recognition of the relationship and the obligations involved
the moral person must choose to care for the other. Referring back to the previous42
example, the man must choose to behave in a caring manner towards his angry nephew,
even if he does not feel loving towards him at the moment. Because the manrecognizes
the importance of their relationship he chooses to care. "[E]thical caring is anchored in
the feeling and recognition of relations that are integral to natural caring, but we shall see
the role of choice and commitment emphasized" (2003, 149). Natural caring arises out of
love for the other. The desire to be ethically caring is guided by a person's sense of his or
her ideal self.
The Ethical Ideal
Noddings proposes that the moral person is obliged to their ideal version of self. It
is that self who propels the moral person into caring for another when the feelings of
natural caring do not arise. Behaving in an authentic manner, being true to the ideal self,
makes the moral person bridge the divide between natural and ethical caring. It provides
the commitment and discipline necessary to care for another.
Noddings states that the ethical ideal arises both from memories of being cared
for, which lead to the capacity for natural caring, and from the desire for continuing
caring relationships. She writes that when we recognize and accept our desire to be and
remain related to others we are able to be receptive to them. Receptivity often leads, she
suggests, to natural caring (2003, 100). Natural caring requires less effort than ethical
caring, so if the moral person cares more often naturally, then her decisions to care for
another will become easier to make. Being a caring person makes caring for others less
difficult. To be caring, therefore, the caring attitude (encompassed in the ideal version of
the self) should be cultivated and this in turn will nourish the caring person and help her
attain the discipline required by ethical caring.
Is the moral person obliged to act on the imperative "I must"? Am I obliged to
care? Noddings replies that the answer depends on the circumstances, on the nature of the
relationship, the claim being made, and the picture of the ideal self that the person holds.
She states that the demand for care can be ignored, it can be acted upon, or it can be
abstained from if the demand is beyond our capacity to fulfil. The first choice, ignoring
the demand, betrays the person who does not care. The last two choices, inaction or
action, are made after consideration of the demand and thus these are actions of care.43
"Caring requires me to respond to the initial impulse with an act of commitment: I
commit myself either to overt action on behalf of the cared-for or I commit myself to
thinking about what I might do" (2003, 81).
We must return to the issue of choice. Noddings writes that it is the consideration
of the demand that follows the feeling of "I must" that is characteristic of the caring
individual. If the "I must" is equal to "I want" then the choice to act is easily made; it is
based on natural caring. When impulse and demand differ or conflict then the decision
becomes more difficult. It is under those circumstances of conflict that ethical caring
occurs and the ethical person responds by choosing the action that most closely conforms
to her picture of the ideal self.
Noddings asserts that the moral person values the caring relationship over any
other form of relatedness, so in order to be good we should be caring. It follows then that
a moral person sees herself as a caring person because she values the quality of caring.
Her ethical ideal self will care. Noddings writes, "I feel the moral 'I must' when I
recognize that my response will either enhance or diminish my ethical ideal" (2003, 83).
The ultimate source of obligation is, in Noddings' words, "The value I place on the
relatedness of caring" (2003, 84).
Caring Obligations
How then does a moral person know whom to care for? Can a person care
for everyone? Noddings reminds the reader that it is the nature of the relationship that
determines whom we must care for. The circles of relationship provide guidance and
limitations for care. She writes that a moral person is obliged to care if there is the
possibility of reciprocity with "completion" in the cared-for. Without the possibility of
completion there is no obligation to care. "I am not obliged to care for starving children
in Africa, because there is no way for this caring to be completed in the other unless I
abandon the caring to which I am obligated," (2003, 86).
The cared-for must be able to reciprocate to the one-caring in order, not
necessarily in kind, but by "receiving the efforts of the one-caring, and this receiving may
be accomplished by a disclosure of his own subjective experience in direct response to
the one-caring or by happy and vigorous pursuit of his own projects" (2003, 151) for an44
ethical relation to be completed. Reciprocity, in terms of ethical relationships, is thus
demonstrated by the ability of the cared-for to provide completion "The freedom,
creativity, and spontaneous disclosure of the cared-for that manifest themselves under the
nurture of the one-caring complete the relation.. .What the cared-for gives to the relation
either in direct response to the one-caring or in personal delight or in happy growth
before her eyes is genuine reciprocity," (2003, 74). Completion, it appears, is the reward
for caring. As stated above, a moral person ought to care for those he or she is in
reciprocal relationships with; these are usually found within or close to our inner circles
of connection.
When does a moral person become obliged to care? Noddings answers this
question with two criteria for obligation. The first tells us when we must care and the
second aids in prioritizing our obligations: 1) If there is a potential for a reciprocal
relationship, "if our caring can be completed in the other" (2003, 86) then we must care.
If there is the potential for a reciprocal relationship with completion then the moral
person must care. If the moral person does not feel motivated by love (natural caring)
then she or he must employ discipline to act morally (ethical caring); 2) The dynamic
potential for growth and reciprocity embedded in the relationship provides guidance for
prioritizing the obligations to care. The greater the potential for evolution in the
relationship the greater is the obligation to care. For example, the obligation to care for
one's own child is greater than the obligation to care for the neighbor's child as the first
relationship is ongoing and has a great potential for development.
Caring for Animals - Noddings
Are moral persons required to care for animals? Should all animals be grouped as
a class and are we required to treat all animals with the same ethic? Are we obliged to
care for dogs? These are questions I brought to my reading of Noddings' care ethic and
presented next are my interpretations of her answers.
First, Noddings reminds the reader that obligation is bounded by the possibility of
reciprocity in the cared-for. She states that animals will always be the cared-for, they are
not able to be the ones-caring. So can animals, as the ones that are cared for, respond in a
manner that is sufficient to fulfill the requirement of reciprocity?45
Before answering this self-posed question Noddings makes three points:
1) Affection for animals varies considerably between persons
2) There is a need for a nonjudgmental ethic based on the differences in affection felt for
animals and the rejection of universalizability
3) We do not view animals as subjects in the same way that we view humans as
subjects. Moreover she states that our primary obligation is to humans because
"ethicality is defined in the human domain... It is not 'speciesism' to respond
differently to different species if the very form of response is species specific" (2003,
152).
She then asks whether we truly view all animals in a similar manner and argues
that lumping all animals together as a class of "interchangeable receptacles" is mistaken
and suggests that animals should be viewed as individuals if we are to "meet the other
morally" (2003, 154). Noddings provides the example of her pet cat Puffy, whom
Noddings admits she sees as an individual and with whom she has a relationship. This
relationship seems to have arisen from natural caring, and encouraged by Puffy's
responsiveness (the cat greets Noddings in the morning and "speaks" to her in a squeaky
voice when she desires milk) developed into one with an ethical dimension. Noddings
writes, "I have incurred an obligation and, as we shall see, this obligation rests on the
establishment of a relation" (2003, 156). Noddings emphasizes again the path from
natural to ethical caring and the importance of choice leading to action. "What we see
clearly here is how completely our ethical caring depends upon both our past experience
in natural caring and our conscious choice. We have made pets of cats. In doing so we
have established the possibility of appreciative and reciprocal relation," (2003, 157). She
notes, however that the relationship and thus the obligation is limited by the limited
nature of Puffy's reciprocity.
A deciding factor for prioritizing obligations to animals, as with obligations to
any other, is dependent upon the dynamic potential of the relationship. Noddings
differentiates animals by their relationships with us. She states that we have obligations
only to those animals that we have actual relationships with, such as our pets. Beyond
those, she writes, "the feeling that arises is more nearly pure sentiment and I risk talking
nonsense as I act upon it" (2003, 159).46
Does Noddings believe moral persons are obliged to care for dogs? I believe she
would answer that yes, the people involved in relationships with dogs are obliged to care
for them. It seems to me, however, based on her discussion of animals as limited in their
responsiveness, that the feeling of care arising from the relationship is that of natural
caring or love, not ethical caring. Her ethic of care is confusing in regards to animals.
Critique of Noddings' Ethics of Care
There are two main problems I have with the ethic of care as proposed by
Nel Noddings. First, she places limitations on whom or what the caring person should
commit to caring for. Noddings is afraid, it appears, of caring too much, or for too many.
It almost seems that Noddings advocates moral stinginess. The second problem is that of
the limits she places on the definition of caring relationships.
The parochialism implied by Noddings' version of care ethics is problematic. It
advocates ignoring the claims of persons or beings one does not know. Although in
theory Noddings advocates invocation of the ideal self in order to guide our behavior, in
reality she advises conservation of our moral energy in order to protect the one-caring. I
believe that the lessons learned by caring for specific, known individuals within the inner
circle of our moral community can and should be extended out to those individuals
inhabiting the less familiar reaches of our world. The experience of being in a
relationship with a specific animal, such as a pet, can be transferred to other situations,
other animals, and with that our obligations, if we are to behave true to our moral ideal,
expand. An excerpt from the essay "Freedom and Wilderness, Wilderness and Freedom"
by author Edward Abbey may help flesh these ideas out.
"I was walking along Aravaipa Creek one afternoon when I noticed fresh
mountain lion tracks leading ahead of me. Big tracks, the biggest lion tracks I've seen
anywhere... .and then I saw him: I felt a kind of affection and the crazy desire to
communicate, to make some kind of emotional, even physical contact with the animal.
After we'd stared at each other for maybe five seconds- it seemed at the time like five
minutes- I held out one hand and took a step toward the big cat and said something
ridiculous like, "Here, kitty, kitty." The cat paused there on three legs; one paw up asif
he wanted to shake hands. But he didn't respond to my advance...47
I turned and walked homeward again, pausing every few steps to look back over
my shoulder. The cat had lowered his front paw but did not follow me. Thelast! saw of
him from the next bend in the canyon, he was still in the same place, watching me go. I
hurried on through the evening, stopping every now and then to look and listen, butif
that cat followed me any further! could detect no sight or sound of it.
I haven't seen a mountain lion since that evening, but the experience remains
shining in my memory. I want my children to have the opportunity for that kind of
experience. I want my friends to have it. I want even our enemies to have it-they need it
most. And someday, possibly, one of our children's children will discoverhow to get
close enough to that mountain lion to shake paws with it, to embrace and caress it, maybe
even to teach it something, and to learn what the lion has to teach us."
This piece demonstrates how the desire for connection can lead to an attitude of
caring about others, which extends our connections outwards beyond our inner circle to
those inhabitants of the very far-removed circles. It shows how a person can move from
caring for one's children to caring about a stranger, even an animal, wild and
unknowable. It provides evidence, contrary to Noddings' concern, that caring can be
expansive and need not be limited solely to those that we are in reciprocal relationships
with, characterized by completion.
In order to live out the ideal version of self, a person must be willing to extend
care to strangers. The person whom I learn to become is shaped by myinteractions with
others in the world. I learn to care about and for others by practicing a caring attitude first
towards those I know best and then by extension to others less known.
The specifics for moral behaviour must be transferable to other concrete
situations and claims should not be neglected just because the one in need is a stranger,
someone we would rather pass on by. Care ethics is grounded in concretesituations but
this should not be a restriction, rather one situation should prepare us for the next. A story
from my life may clarify this point. As I was driving to an event that I was involved in on
campus I saw a car stopped. As I slowed down, a bigblack lump became evident in the
road. The lump was a dog, hit by the driver of the now -stopped car. My thoughts were
conflicted; should 1 stop, say I am a vet and take care of the dog? Or should I continue to48
the lecture that I was supposed to attend? If I stopped I would be late to the lecture, if I
made it at all, and moreover would arrive wet (it was a typical rainy Oregon winter
night), disheveled, and possibly bloody.
I stopped. I had to. All my previous encounters with dogs had taught me that they
are creatures worthy of moral treatment and this one, in her helplessness, had made her
claim on me, a claim I could not ignore. She needed my care and I was obliged to help
her. I did not choose to encounter this dog in that situation, but based on past experiences
with dogs I felt I had no choice but to provide care for her.
Noddings' proposal that we confine our obligations to those we choose to enter
into relationships with becomes irrelevant when the practice of ethical caring meets
needy animals in real situations. It seems almost hypocritical to the essence of a caring
ethic to limit that caring only to those we know best and to those we choose to enter into
such relationships with. I think Noddings fails to recognize one of the most important
aspects of her ethic of care: the moral person is obliged to act in a caring manner in many
circumstances where the relationship is unacknowledged or even not apparent. I accept
that the obligation to self is real but propose that the connection to the stranger is also real
and signifies a relationship also worthy of the obligation to care.
The second problematic issue is twofold and based on the limits placed on the
definition of relationship. Noddings' definition of relationship is too narrow in focus and
fails to capture what I see as the essential spirit of relationships, that of connection.
Firstly, Noddings focuses on relationships that are composed of parties with inherent
power differences, as evidenced by the terms she uses in describing the two parties
involved: the "cared-for" and the "one-caring". She neglects the type of relationship that
is not based on one party taking care of the other, who receives the care of the first and
thus, in turn, provides completion, which is the impetus for further care giving by the
first. This cycle of events does not describe many of the relationships I am familiar with,
those that are based on sharing of common goals, interests, or histories, those connections
that we choose to develop that are not based on power imbalances but rather on equality.
Relationships of this sort with animals are also de-emphasised and to some extent almost
dismissed. Many human-animal relationships are very important to the parties involved
and neglecting this aspect of care ethics seems an oversight at best and negligent if put in49
more critical terms. Relationships based on equality can also be moral, exhibiting the
required characteristics of reciprocity, dynamism and potential for growth, and they need
to be brought back into the discussion.
Secondly, the requirement for reciprocity with completion puts too narrow a
constraint on what we may term a caring relationship. Noddings' theory is confusing
when she describes the nature of our obligations to animals. We are obliged to behave
morally towards those with whom we are involved in reciprocal relationships. She states
that a baby can reciprocate a mother's care by smiling and burbling in response to her
loving touch, but that an animal's responsive calls and gestures to our presence are not
necessarily demonstrations of reciprocity, or if they are it is a reciprocity somehow
limited by their animal nature. She writes, "In connection with animals, however, we may
find it possible to refuse relation itself on the grounds of a species-specific impossibility
of any form of reciprocity in caring," (2003, 86). An animal, she states, cannot provide
for completion in relationships. 'The potential for response in animals, for example, is
nearly static; they cannot respond in mutuality, nor can the nature of their response
change substantially, "(2003, 87). This is very confusing, as it seems to me that
Noddings has conflicting beliefs. First she states that animals cannot provide the
reciprocity necessary for an ethical relationship. Yet, Noddings admits to being involved
in such a relationship with her cat.
To clear up the ambiguity enmeshed in Noddings' definition of reciprocity I
propose an alternative definition, one that acknowledges a wider range of relationships
such as those felt between parties both with and without power differences, and those
relationships we share with our pets. Reciprocity can be defined as "A mutual action;
principle or practice of give and take" (Oxford English Dictionary, 1982). To be
reciprocal means "1. Mutual (reciprocal love, protection, injuries), complementary,
expressing mutual action or relation. 2. (Math) function or expression so related to
another that their function is unity," (1982). Thus reciprocity in relationships does not
require completion, but rather mutuality, an exchange in kind.
Many of our relationships with animals do not provide reciprocity with
completion. Edward Abbey's close encounter with the mountain lion evidenced a type of
relationship, albeit brief, in which there was an exchange of experiences (reciprocity). It50
was an encounter that shaped or influenced each party's life to some extent. My encounter
with the injured dog on the road was also an exchange and we had a short-term
relationship that mattered morally.
While many human-animal relationships do not provide reciprocity with
completion, I do believe that dogs, in their relationships as companions to humans, are
capable of providing reciprocity with completion. I can support this proposal with many
examples of this sort of reciprocal relationship.
Relations with Dogs
To begin, we need to recognize how much dogs give us in return for the care we
afford them. Pet keeping can be seen as having educational value. It has been shown that
children raised in families that have pets behave differently towards others than children
raised in petless homes. Animal ethicist, James Serpell, cites a claim made by Boris
Levinson, a pediatric psychiatrist, that pets have a beneficial role to play in human
development. He states that "[T]he experience of caring for a pet during childhood could
make a person more sensitive to the feelings and attitudes of others, inculcate tolerance,
self-acceptance and self -control" (Serpell, 1996:89).
People let down their guard to animals. As a vet I have seen this many times. A
few months ago a seemingly taciturn elderly man brought his dog in for treatment of a
supefficial wound. At first the man was reluctant to talk to his pet in front of me, but after
I began to chat to the animal, he too joined in the conversation and soon we three were
involved in a positive and open interaction. I learned that his dog was his closest
companion and without her he would have no one at home to talk to or love. Dogs are a
constant source of affection in our lives and they let us know that whatever we look like
in the morning, how hard our day has been, or how late we get home, they will still greet
us with an exuberant welcome. They give us nonjudgmental companionship.
Pets can help us expand our boundaries. They allow us to dote on them, to pet
them, to love without fear of rejection. They ask us to romp, to roll in the grass with
them, to run. They encourage us to feel freedom from the usual constraints for a little
while when they grin and ask us to throw a Frisbee across the lawn, or when they bow
down in solicitation of a game of chase. We almost can't help responding with a smile ofIll
our own and sometimes even the most serious adult will consent to take off her shoes and
dance barefoot with her dog.
In a reversal of the usual roles of human as care provider and dog as cared-for
some dogs take care of their people. Not only do many women rely on their dogs for
protection but service dogs, such as those trained as guide dogs for the blind, wonder
dogs who can predict and warn their owners of oncoming epileptic seizures, dogs that
visit residents in managed-care facilities, provide care for their human companions.
When I visited the Guide Dogs for the Blind facility in Boring, Oregon, I was astounded
to see a young Labrador dog lead his blind human companion through a maze of
obstacles and even steer her away from a low hanging branch. My dog guards and
provides protection for me on my solo hikes in the wilderness. She has even gone to seek
help for me when I was injured and alone on the trail.
Dogs also help us by giving us opportunities to learn and practice compassionate
caring within a safe environment. Stephen Webb writes, "The human dog relationship
can engender a kind of valuing that is appropriate in various ways to our relationship with
other animals as well "(Webb, 1998, 7). Thus the relationship of mutual giving, as
evident in our interactions with our pet dogs, can enable us to reform our treatment of all
beings, extending our circle of compassion to include many others. It gives us practice in
natural caring, thereby helping the ethical person to become closer to his or her ideal self.
It is their quiet acceptance, their expressions of loyalty, and their firm resolve to
keep us in the center of their universe that makes us reciprocate their feelings and love
them back with an affection that transcends the species barrier and allows us to call them
our companions. I believe this sketch provides evidence of a few of the myriad waysin
which dogs amply demonstrate they are creatures very capable and willing to care,
reciprocate and enter fully into relationships with humans.
Obligation to Dogs
Dogs are "beings in relationship" with humans. The existence of Canisfamiliaris
as a species is due to that fact; dogs would not be dogs if a few intrepid wolveshad not
deigned to domestication. In this way, dogs are unique, owing their identity to a
relationship with another species, as no other animal does. Cats hold a special place in52
our society as well but cats, wild and tame,have not become as dependent on us for their
beingness as dogs have. House cats are in essence miniature wild cats, retaining their
independence and ancestral nature.
Dogs are defined by their relationship to humans. As humans are necessarily part
of dogs' identities and as we have encouraged them to integrate into human society, we
owe them morally sound treatment. Dogs should becared for and treated ethically
because ours (dogs and humans) is a long history of intertwined lives; it is atale in which
both species have interacted so intimately and for so long that the speciesbarrier has
been, in a sense, transcended. Dogs hold a special place in human society; theyinhabit
the realm of those in close relationship to us, along with our families and ourfriends.
Dogs and humans shared first the hearth, now the home. Many of us count them among
those dwelling in our inner circle of relationships.
Some of us will care about dogs; some of us will care for dogs. Our obligations to
dogs are based, as are our obligations to humans, upon the nature of ourrelationships
with them and the vision we each hold of our ideal moral self.53
CHAPTER FIVE
EPILOGUE
Dogs may be viewed as a bridge species, a connection between humans and the
world of nonhuman animals and nature. As the most domesticated of animals they are
both familiar to us and yet remain in some ways, alien. They will always be, no matter
how well adapted to human society, nonhuman animals. As our companions dogs provide
more than just a glimpse into the ways of animals; they provide hands-on, direct and
daily contact with nonhuman animals. As the familiar animal in the midst of human
society, dogs can be the catalyst for a new way of thinking about animals. They can steer
us towards a paradigm shift, one that moves us away from anthropomorphism and
towards a biocentric perspective.
I would like to see the opportunity provided for students to encounter this new
paradigm by way of the classes I teach. Currently the veterinary medical program is
lacking, I believe, in discussion about the nature and depth of human-animal
relationships. The emphasis of the curriculum is on the science of veterinary medicine
and more spiritual and emotional aspects of the art of healing and the virtue of
compassion may be neglected. The majority of veterinary students decide to become vets
not for the economic rewards, nor social status, but rather because they feel compelled to
help animals. Unfortunately this vocational desire can be nearly forgotten, or at best is
reduced to a vague memory, in the very hard work and stresses of the professional
curriculum. I would like to help repair this situation by teaching a class that focuses both
on the ethics of animal relations and the human- animal bond. The class might be
interactive and discussion-based, providing time for vet students to remember why they
decided to become veterinarians and a place for nurturing the compassion that their initial
impulse sowed.
I would like to teach this class to a broader audience as well, perhaps to
undergraduates or to the general public. I believe the same format of readings and
facilitated discussions would be valuable to anyone interested in the ethics of human and
animal interactions. I am certain that I too would benefit and learn much from leading a54
class such as this. Moreover, I would like to share with others what I have learned in the
writing of this thesis.
The reading I have done in order to write this thesis, followed by numerous
discussions and hours of mental processing of the material, have brought focus and
clarity to my initial general interest in the subject of animal ethics. I have realised the
importance of recognizing that by caring for dogs one expands one's circle of interactions
to include nonhuman animals. When a person cares for her companion dog, and is
cognizant of the dog's individuality, granting other dogs individuality is a natural
progression. The initial extension of caring only for human persons, to that of caring for a
dog, can therefore lead to caring for other dogs, and perhaps to caring about and for other
species of animals.
A crucial first step for transcendence of the species barrier may be development
of a concrete caring relationship with a companion animal. The caring person who
extends the boundaries of the moral community to include dogs among the members of
her inner circle may as a consequence consider caring for other nonhuman entities, such
as wild animals, trees, deserts and mountains. The caring person stands firmly rooted in a
world that provides many rich opportunities for caring. I believe that the ethic of caring
for dogs can facilitate the ethic of caring for all.55
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